See? I told you there are spies from the north
See? I told you there are spies from the north
A 2021 espionage case has come under scrutiny again.
To understand the full story, it is easier to look at the earlier reports about the case as well.
Because
Lee, who was additionally indicted this time, was the one who recruited an active-duty military officer who actually attempted to obtain military secrets,
while the person who actually handed over military secrets and related materials at the time was Captain Kim, an active-duty soldier,
and Captain Kim was also tried separately and is currently serving his final sentence.
Therefore, it is difficult to understand the whole picture of this case by following only the actions of Lee, who was additionally indicted this time.
So, in chronological order,
let’s take a look at what each of the two men did.
A Chronological Record of Contact with a North Korean Agent
2016
Lee first met a North Korean agent, A, who belonged to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, through an online cryptocurrency trading community.
2018
Lee worked for an illegal gambling website operated by A, sending spam messages to attract customers.
Around this time, A first asked Lee to find out the personal details of an active-duty South Korean military officer.
However, since this was apparently not included in the prosecution’s charges, it appears that it did not actually progress to the point of obtaining the officer’s information.
February 2021
Lee was operating a cryptocurrency investment company in Hanam, Gyeonggi Province.
At this time, A gave him US$600,000,
worth approximately 660 million won at the time, in cryptocurrency, supposedly as operating funds for the company.
In September of the same year, out of US$300,000 in investment profits received from A, he took US$270,000 as his share.
This is where the case begins.
The beginning of the case that led to this additional indictment and a 5-year prison sentence
May–July 2021
Acting on A’s instructions, Lee approached the head of a North Korean defector organization.
Lee offered to provide about 1 million won in monthly financial support.
After the organization head created a cryptocurrency wallet, Lee gave the wallet address to A,
and A sent the organization head 1 million won worth of cryptocurrency.
Lee subsequently received photographs and videos of events involving the distribution of leaflets toward North Korea from the organization.
Leaflets toward North Korea are materials sent from South Korea toward North Korea.
It would be difficult to believe that an organization of North Korean defectors who had escaped to South Korea and were adapting well to life there would make leaflets praising North Korea.
Also, the articles do not state that the organization participated in espionage activities or was punished for doing so.
Therefore, it appears possible that the organization did not know that the photographs and videos it provided were being used for a North Korean operation.
Lee also approached another North Korean defector YouTuber, suggesting that he would provide financial support, and collected contact information, photographs, and details about the person’s activities.
June 2021
Lee contacted A more than 30 times over approximately 10 months.
The two discussed ways to collect information about and recruit active-duty military officers.
They had now reached the stage of actually discussing it together.
I guess getting started really is the hardest part.
Lee also reported to A on matters including purchasing a watch-shaped hidden camera needed to hack the KJCCS, South Korea’s military joint command and control system, and procuring components for making hacking equipment.
July 2021
A gave Lee a file containing the names, assigned units, resident registration numbers, addresses, and family relationships of seven active-duty military officers.
A then instructed him to gather additional information and recruit them.
Among them, Lee obtained photographs of Captain B’s face and uniform from B’s social media.
He then hired a private investigator to conduct a background check on B.
Through A, Lee paid the private investigator 2.5 million won worth of Bitcoin and obtained information about B’s assigned unit, military housing, residential unit number, schedule, and other details.
He also approached another captain, C.
Lee offered C up to US$1 million if C provided information such as the military organizational chart.
However, C refused, and the recruitment attempt failed.
US$1 million would have been approximately 1.3 billion won at the exchange rate at the time.
C refused a demand to hand over military information in exchange for an amount of money close to the jackpot from winning first prize in the lottery.
I have to give C credit.
The case for which he is currently serving a 4-year sentence
July 2021–January 2022
During the same period, acting on A’s instructions, Lee committed another offense in which he actually recruited an active-duty military officer.
In this case, Captain Kim, an active-duty officer recruited by Lee, actually participated in activities to obtain military secrets.
Lee approached Captain Kim, conveyed instructions from the North Korean agent, and Captain Kim engaged in activities aimed at obtaining military information using a watch-shaped hidden camera and hacking equipment.
Captain Kim actually handed military secrets and related materials to Lee’s side, and also handed over information related to KJCCS.
In this case, Lee was the one who recruited the officer and directed the operation,
while the captain was the actual soldier who handed over the materials.
Lee was sentenced in this case to four years in prison and four years’ suspension of qualifications,
and the sentence was finalized by the Supreme Court.
Suspension of qualifications is a criminal punishment that restricts certain public qualifications and rights,
and in this case, it appears to have been imposed to deprive him of voting rights.
Captain Kim was also tried separately and sentenced to 10 years in prison and a fine of 50 million won,
and that sentence was finalized.
In other words, this case involves two people: Lee, who recruited the officer, and Captain Kim, who actually handed over military information.
April 2022
In this case involving the 5-year sentence, Lee’s communications with North Korean agent A, along with their discussions about gathering information and recruiting people, continued until this period.
This effectively marks the end of the period during which the offenses in the case for which he was additionally indicted were committed.
The crimes committed up to this point were later indicted separately, and the trial result came in 2026.
After April 2022 [Arrest, Detention, Indictment, and Trial]
Afterward, it was confirmed that Lee was detained and indicted in connection with this case and stood trial.
He did not remain in custody continuously throughout the trial,
and it was confirmed that there was also a period during which he was released on bail.
Therefore, the period from his arrest, detention, and indictment in April 2022 through 2025 should not simply be described as “serving four years in prison.”
At that time, the judgment had not yet become final, so legally this was a period of pretrial detention and trial proceedings.
After the four-year prison sentence became final, it became the sentence he is currently serving.
January 2025 [4-Year Prison Sentence]
Lee was sentenced at trial to four years in prison and four years’ suspension of qualifications.
December 2025 [4-Year Sentence Finalized]
After going through an appeal and a final appeal, the Supreme Court finalized the four-year prison sentence and four-year suspension of qualifications.
An appeal? That makes me angry.
From this point on, the statement mentioned earlier, “He is currently serving a four-year sentence,” becomes accurate.
Then what happens to the time he spent in prison before the sentence became final?
That period is considered pretrial detention.
Once the sentence becomes final, the days already spent in detention are counted toward the prison term.
September 2026 [Sentence in the Additional Indictment Case]
The Seoul Central District Court’s Criminal Division 21 sentenced Lee to
five years in prison and five years’ suspension of qualifications for separate criminal acts committed from May 2021 through April 2022.
Therefore, Lee did not newly begin espionage activities in September 2026.
The crimes committed in 2021–2022 were indicted separately at a later date, and the judgment was handed down this time.
In the end, this case can be understood as follows.
The 4-year prison sentence case
→ Lee recruited active-duty military officer Captain Kim.
→ Captain Kim actually handed over military information.
→ Lee received a final four-year prison sentence for this case and is currently serving it.
→ Captain Kim separately received a final sentence of 10 years in prison.
This 5-year prison sentence case
→ Lee approached a North Korean defector organization and a North Korean defector YouTuber.
→ He obtained information on seven active-duty military officers.
→ He collected additional information about the officers and attempted to recruit them.
→ He discussed hacking equipment and other matters with a North Korean agent.
→ These crimes were additionally indicted, resulting in a five-year prison sentence in September 2026.
And the timing of the offenses in the two cases overlaps considerably.
This may raise the issue of whether the offenses constitute concurrent crimes committed after a previous judgment had become final.
In simple terms, concurrent crimes of this kind are based on the idea that
if someone committed several offenses before being punished, the law should treat that person differently from someone who commits another offense after already being punished for an earlier one.
If Lee serves his four-year sentence for espionage and then, whether it is 2027 or 2028, does it again,
then he should be properly punished, right?
You just can’t reform this person.
That’s it. This is how it would go.
But in Lee’s case, while he is serving the four-year sentence for the 2022 case,
he is being indicted again for the 2021 case.
It is somewhat different.
That is something for the trial court to decide.
After all, we cannot say for certain that the sentence will necessarily be reduced or anything like that.
But doesn’t it make you wonder whether this is really okay?
Four years in prison for someone who sold out the country.
Doesn’t that seem a little lacking?
That feeling that something is lacking is exactly right.
Crimes that threaten national security, especially those involving military secrets, should be dealt with severely.
| Crime | Criminal Act | Statutory Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Inducing a foreign power to wage war | Article 92 | Death penalty or life imprisonment |
| Joining the enemy | Article 93 | Death penalty |
| Military recruitment for the enemy | Article 94 | Death penalty or life imprisonment |
| Providing facilities to the enemy | Article 95 | Death penalty or life imprisonment |
| Destroying facilities for the enemy | Article 96 | Death penalty or life imprisonment |
| Providing goods to the enemy | Article 97 | Life imprisonment or imprisonment for 5 years or more |
| Espionage | Article 98 | Death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for 7 years or more |
| General assistance to the enemy | Article 99 | Life imprisonment or imprisonment for 3 years or more |
Inducing a foreign power to wage war (Article 92) requires acts such as conspiring with a foreign country to cause war against the Republic of Korea.
Joining the enemy (Article 93) refers to joining an enemy country and taking up arms against the Republic of Korea.
And so on.
Death penalty, death penalty, death penalty, death penalty. It clearly says so.
Don’t do it.
You could actually die.
Then did Lee’s conduct not rise to that level?
This is what the precedents say.
| Case | Application of Criminal Act Article 98 | Actual Sentence |
|---|---|---|
| Supreme Court, Oct. 26, 1961, 4294Hyeongsang562 | Infiltrated under North Korean instructions but failed to collect information → Attempted espionage | Prison sentence (The Supreme Court’s judgment did not restate the exact sentence imposed by the lower court, so the precise term cannot be stated here with certainty.) |
| Supreme Court, Dec. 12, 1963, 63Do312 | Detected and collected military secrets under North Korean instructions → Completed espionage | Death penalty |
| Supreme Court, Jan. 28, 1969, 68Do1709 | Agent dispatched from North Korea to South Korea → Attempted espionage | Life imprisonment |
Back in the 1960s and 1970s, it would have been the death penalty or life imprisonment.
Even in 63Do312, the case ended at the collection stage, yet the prosecution sought the death penalty.
| Comparison | Past Case 63Do312 | Recent Kim Case |
|---|---|---|
| North Korean instructions | Yes | Yes |
| Detection and collection of military secrets | Yes | Yes |
| Actual transfer to North Korea | No | Yes |
| Criminal Act Article 98 | Applied | Separate verification required as to whether it was applied |
| Result | Death penalty | 10 years in prison |
Perhaps some people would say that times have changed and the world has changed.
That’s true.
That is certainly true.
It also seems that, if reunification is the goal, it would not be possible to continue treating the other side as an enemy as rigidly as in the past.
It is also true that there are now many options besides reunification through armed force, with guns and weapons being exchanged,
so it would be difficult to simply say that such a view is completely wrong.
But here’s the thing.
When, someday, the leaders of the two countries sit around a table,
talk about reunification, present their conditions,
and go through the process of reaching an agreement,
is there really any advantage for us
if a great deal of our information has already been handed over to the other side?
Is there really any deal in the world that works that way…?
Article References
Article References
Chosun Ilbo, 「Man in His 40s Who Collected Information on North Korean Defectors and Active-Duty Military Officers Under Orders from a North Korean Agent Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison」, 2026.09.07.
Yonhap News TV, 「40s Man Who Recruited Military Officers and Leaked Military Secrets Under Orders from North Korean Hackers Receives Final Prison Sentence」, 2025.12.28.
